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Article 7

FAIRNESS FOR SALE IN THE
MARKETPLACE
RIcHARD

A. SAmP*

One of the reasons for the tremendous success in recent times of
the environmental justice movement has been its ability to put
forward a pretty vague agenda. Certainly, everybody is for justice
and is against racism, and as a result, there have been a lot of
different strands to what has been called environmental justice. I
think one of the advantages of a program such as this today is that
it starkly illustrates the competing strands. Any effort, any movement that is going to include both Dr. Lazarus and Professor Taibi
really is not a unified movement of any sort.
On the one hand, there are the people such as Professor Lazarus
who are very much concerned about distribution and think that
what we need to have is fairness. On the other hand, there are
those who perhaps are much more concerned with a fundamental
reorientation of society.' I think that I can fairly say, from what I
have heard, that Professor Taibi fits into that latter category, and
these two strands really are very much competing with one another. My remarks today really are going to focus on the fairness
argument, in part because my background is much more in civil
rights-related law, and because fairness is an issue I think about
much more often. The public perceptions of the purposes of the
environmental justice movement have not really been along the
lines of what Professor Taibi has been talking about.2 The public
has perceived the movement not as an effort to bring about a fundamental reorientation of society, but rather simply to distribute
things in a fairer fashion.
* Chief Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation; former litigator with Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D.C.; former law clerk for the Honorable Robert E.
DeMascio, United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan.
1 Richard J. Lazarus, Distributionin Environmental Justice:Is There a Middle Ground?,
9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 481 (1994).
2 Anthony D. Taibi, Environmental Justice, StructuralEconomic Theory, and Community Economic Empowerment, 9 ST. JoHb's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 491 (1994).
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I am not going to repeat what Dr. Greve has already been talking about, which is the fundamental lack of justifications for an
environmental justice movement. Rather, I wish to point out that
while everybody is in favor of fairness, I do not see any way that a
system like that which has been proposed in several pieces of legislation before Congress, could ever really accomplish anything
meaningful.
First of all, most people agree that there is very little way to
measure fairness. The fundamental problem is that many people
disagree as to what is a "locally undesirable land use" ("LULU");
what are the sort of things that I do not want in my neighborhood?
For example, there are many neighborhoods that object to having
group homes for released prisoners or for mentally and physically
handicapped people in the neighborhood. Others would say, "Well,
wait a second, that is part of your responsibility as a member of
society; to accept people like that in your neighborhood." They
would not consider such facilities to be LULUs at all; they are
something that everybody should want in their neighborhood.
As another example, there are many people who would not want
a sanitary landfill anywhere near their town or would not want to
have a nuclear power plant within their metropolitan area.
Others would say, "Wait a second, nuclear power is the cleanest,
safest form of energy." Thus, any system that tries to equitably
distribute these sorts of burdens is inevitably going to inevitably
founder on the inability to reach any sort of consensus as to what
really is a burden.
Secondly, the major issue that needs to be faced in trying to
come up with any sort of redistribution scheme is whether or not
current imbalances in distribution of LULUs are causally related
to factors such as social class and race. There are a large number
of studies that have been done regarding whether race is an independent factor or whether the real causes of unequal distribution are economic. But the point that all of these studies have
failed to address is: what was the neighborhood like at the time of
the original siting? That question is critical, because if current
residents were not living in a neighborhood, the residents' skin
color or social class can hardly have played a role in the siting
3 Dr. Michael S. Greve, EnvironmentalJustice or PoliticalOpportunism?,9 ST. JOmN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 475 (1994).
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decision. The vast majority of "environmental justice" studies

have looked at LULUs that were sited at a time when there was
not even a community in the vicinity of the waste dump-or
whatever type of facility we are talking about-and the community built up later. Yet most of these studies assume that we can
draw conclusions regarding the reasons for a siting decision from
the composition of the current population.
There is substantial evidence to suggest that what brings poor
people to the vicinity of a LULU is that the land costs are going to
be less there. If that is the case, then most efforts to redistribute
are bound to fail because the process will simply repeat itself. The
moment that we start saying, "Wait a second, let's redistribute
these LULUs to the wealthier areas," as an area becomes loaded
down with undesirable sites of one sort or another, those who can
afford to are going to move away. Those who will be replacing
them are those who cannot afford to live elsewhere. That may not
happen overnight, so maybe there is something to be said for an
attempt at short-term fairness. History has shown, however, particularly in the instance of whites fleeing inner cities in response
to perceived deterioration of the quality of life, that neighborhoods
are going to change, and you are going to re-establish "inequities"
in the siting of LULUs.
Having said that, there is no question that we ought to be concerned about proven instances of intentional racial discrimination,
and we ought to try to make sure that intentional discrimination
is not allowed to continue. In fact, EPA, in response to some complaints that have been filed, has taken a very careful look at siting
decisions in several states.4 I would have no objection, if EPA finds
that race was an intentional factor in these siting decisions, to an
EPA effort to impose a remedy in these cases.
However, absent a finding of intentional discrimination, EPA
really does not provide a solution. The one thing that appalls me
as I read many of the articles that have been written in this area
is that people say, "Title VI is a great untapped area for people to
be looking at," and I know later panels will be discussing this.
4 See Harris DeVille, Catch Word or Catch 22?, LA. IDus. ENVTL. ADVISOR, June 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Wilson Dizard III, Regulators Say LES
Must Reply to Environmental Racism Charges, NucLEAR FUEL, Mar. 14, 1994, at 6; EPA to
Investigate Pennsylvania Environmental Justice Complaint, ENVT. WK., Apr. 21, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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The fact is, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no application when there is not
proof of intentional racial discrimination.5
That is true of most of the existing remedies, so that obviously
some sort of new legislation is going to be required if proponents of
"environmental justice" are to make any headway in the courts.
Yet, any sort of new legislation is going to run into the practicality
problems that I have been referring to up to this point.
One other objection to any legislation is that it would run
counter to the theory underlying zoning law; the whole purpose of
zoning laws over time has been to try to get away from equal distribution. The idea generally is that we ought to have an industrial portion of a community and we ought to have a residential
portion of a community, so that the great majority of the people do
not have to live next to the cement factory. The moment you start
saying that you have to have undesirable sites equally distributed
around a community, you are going to be running into the problem
that zoning law has been designed to counteract. We ought to
have spots that the great majority of people can live in, where we
can minimize the undesirable features of their neighborhood.
There are certain types of undesirable facilities that perhaps
can perhaps be exceptions to this rule. When you are talking
about low-cost housing or other kinds of facilities where: 1) there
is a demand for hundreds of facilities of that type in every metropolitan area, but 2) the facilities tend to be on a small scale, then I
think there is something to be said for siting such facilities equally
in all neighborhoods. To the extent that we, as a society, are going
to mandate building of low-cost housing, every town ought to be
doing their fair share. But when you talk about large-scale facilities, of which only a few are needed, such as radioactive waste
dumps, it does not make sense to make sure that they are evenly
distributed, because not only is it going to be a self-defeating process, but also it works against traditional zoning assumptions.
Finally, I think that we ought to understand the real agenda of
many of those who are behind the "environmental justice" movement. That is the agenda that Professor Taibi is pursuing: a fun5 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
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damental reordering of how we view ourselves as a society 6 and
getting away from the notion that economic growth is an unmitigated good. I, on the other hand, happen to subscribe to that notion. I happen to think that the one way-the surest way-of
bringing people out of poverty in this country is to encourage economic growth. One obviously needs to be concerned about fairness; but as I said, fairness is not really the primary agenda of
many people within the environmental justice movement. The
primary agenda is to give people in communities of color the same
tools that people in upper middle class neighborhoods have had up
to this point, so that everybody will be able to defeat the
"problems" in their community. The result will be to force changes
in our industrial society because we will not be able to build the
types of facilities that are needed to maintain an industrial
society.
One solution that the environmental justice movement has generally been badmouthing, but that I think is one of the really few
plausible solutions to public discontent over industrial siting decisions, is to allow people to bid for the right to have LULUs in their
neighborhood. We should let the market work. We should give
people economic incentives to accept LULUs. For example, we
have virtually unlimited space in this country for landfills. The
problem is that nobody wants one in their community. So let's let
people bid for landfills; let them say, "We will allow one in our
neighborhood provided you pay us ' million dollars." That sort of
solution is going to leave the least number of people unhappy, and
perhaps will get us away from what are clearly very strong perceptions of unfairness in the present siting system.
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See generally Taibi, supra note 2.

